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Abstract 
This paper examines the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory of capital structure 
and finds that for the case of equity the usual TCE logic is not fully worked out. In 
particular, an analysis of the key issue of bilateral dependency between the firm and its 
shareholders is absent. To fill this gap in the literature, the paper further develops the theory 
of the equity governance structure by taking account of the concept of bilateral dependency 
over the lifecycle of the firm. The paper finds that, both theoretically and empirically, 
contractual hazards are indeed mitigated for the case of fast growing young firms which are 
dependent on shareholders to finance future growth. In contrast, for the case of mature 
firms, which in virtue of their large free cash flows are independent from shareholders, 
contractual safeguards are altered to the disadvantage of shareholders and consequently 
managerial discretion costs increase.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In contrast to traditional theories of capital structure, Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) holds that debt and equity are alternative governance structures and that their use to 
finance individual investment projects will depend on the characteristics of the assets 
required to undertake those projects (Williamson, 2008, 2002, 1996, pp. 171-194). In 
particular, TCE emphasizes the concept of “specific assets”, that is, assets that would lose 
most of their productive value if the project failed and they had to be redeployed to the 
second best use. Thus, TCE argues that if the requisite assets are non-specific, then debt is 
the appropriate governance structure to use in order to finance the project. On the other 
hand, if the necessary assets are highly specific, then the use of the equity governance 
structure is warranted.  
Thus far the empirical literature has largely corroborated these predictions of the TCE 
capital structure theory (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993; Kochhar, 
1996; Močnik 2001; Benmelech et al., 2005). However, if we compare the theory with 
other work in the field of TCE, we find that the basic logic has not been fully developed in 
particular with respect to the equity governance structure. For instance, consider the 
paradigmatic “make or buy” decision (Williamson, 2005). In the presence of asset 
specificity, through the fundamental transformation process, TCE predicts that a situation 
of bilateral dependency will emerge if the supplier and the buyer decide to sign the 
contract. Since the parties to the contract live in an uncertain world there is scope for 
opportunism to emerge when unforeseen disturbances occur. In order to cement the 
relationship the parties to the contract find that the institution of governance structures 
buttressed by contractual safeguards is mutually beneficial and therefore decide to institute 
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them voluntarily. Moreover, there is a clear role for institutions as formal or informal 
restrictions on opportunism in the background of the transaction.  
In contrast, the TCE theory of the uses of debt and equity does not fully follow this 
tried and tested logic. As a consequence, several key issues are not examined in detail. In 
particular, for the equity governance structure, a discussion of the central issue of bilateral 
dependency in the presence of specific assets is noticeably absent and consequently 
important questions are left unanswered: will the managers of the large modern 
corporation, with its large internal cash flows, depend on shareholders for the financing of 
non-redeployable assets? Are shareholders, who can sell their shares anytime, dependent on 
the corporation? If bilateral dependency does not take place at all times, will the 
governance structures in place effectively prevent opportunism from occurring? If 
opportunism occurs, in which form(s) will it likely be manifested? Moreover, what will be 
the role of institutions in mitigating opportunism? In sum, the theoretical treatment of the 
equity governance structure clearly requires a more in-depth analysis of the processes 
involved.  
The objective of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature by providing a more 
complete theory of the equity governance structure as well as empirical assessments to back 
the testable predictions derived thereof. Thus, taking proper account of the concept of 
bilateral dependency and of the notion that the financial situation of the firm changes in 
predictable ways over the firm’s lifecycle (Mueller, 2003, pp. 80-82), this paper concludes 
that contractual hazards are indeed mitigated for the case of fast growing firms whose 
managements are dependent on shareholders to finance future growth. On the other hand, 
the analysis suggests that for the case of mature firms with large free cash flows and few 
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growth opportunities contractual safeguards such as the board of directors will lose 
effectiveness and unconstrained opportunism will emerge as the firm becomes financially 
independent from its shareholders. When these two predictions are tested empirically the 
results indicate that increased managerial discretion costs are a characteristic of mature 
firms. Conversely, the evidence is consistent with relatively low managerial discretion costs 
for the case of young companies.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the TCE theory on the 
uses of debt and equity, employs the basic TCE logic to fully develop the theory of the 
equity governance structure and states the main testable propositions of this paper. Section 
3 discusses the econometric specifications to test the theory´s predictions. Section 4 
describes the data and presents the econometric results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. A NEW LOOK AT THE EQUITY GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
In this section we take up the theoretical discussion on corporate finance where 
Williamson (2008, 2002, 1996, pp. 171-194) left off and attempt to develop it further by 
considering the key issue of bilateral dependency in the presence of specific assets. Our 
objective is to provide a more complete theoretical treatment of the equity governance 
structure.  
As in other applications, for the case of debt and equity as governance structures, TCE 
appeals to the “efficient alignment hypothesis to predict which transactions go where” 
(Williamson, 2010). According to this hypothesis “transactions which differ in their 
attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their cost and 
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competences, so as to effect a (mainly) transaction cost economizing outcome” 
(Williamson, 2010, 2005). Figure 1 illustrates the key points of the efficient alignment 
hypothesis for the case of the uses of debt and equity. On the left hand side of the figure we 
have included two transactions which mainly differ in their degree of asset specificity. As 
in previous TCE work, we let k denote a measure of transaction-specific assets, and we use 
𝑘 to represent the switch over value where parties to a transaction are indifferent as to the 
choice of debt and equity. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Moreover, on the right hand side of Figure 1, we portray debt and equity as governance 
structures which differ in their setup and ex-post costs and in their degree of flexibility to 
adapt to unforeseen disturbances. Thus, while debt is rules-based and consequently has a 
low degree of flexibility to adapt to unexpected disturbances (default leads to liquidation), 
it has relatively low setup costs. On the other hand, equity has higher setup and ex-post 
costs than debt but it is more flexible in that it features safeguards (which following 
previous literature we denote with the letter ‘s’) mainly in the form of a board of directors 
that is awarded to the shareholders.  
As shown in Figure 1, according to the efficient alignment hypothesis transaction costs 
are economized when transactions featuring low asset specificity (0 < 𝑘 < 𝑘 ) are financed 
using debt, while transactions characterized by a high degree of asset specificity (𝑘 > 𝑘 ) 
are financed with equity. If the adequate alignment does not occur, TCE predicts that the 
transaction will be unstable contractually. For instance, if highly specific assets are to be 
financed with debt far sighted debt-holders will figure out that the value of their preemptive 
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claims are low and will require a high risk premium. The firm in turn, in view of these 
excessively high financing costs, may attempt to realign the transaction by replacing the 
specialized assets for more re-deployable ones, but this would cause production costs to 
increase or quality to decline (Williamson, 1996, p. 184). In contrast, if a transaction 
characterized by low asset specificity is financed with equity TCE predicts that both setup 
and ex-post costs will be much higher than optimal, and consequently a leveraged buyout 
would be the manner in which market forces would realign the transaction to a more 
economical governance structure (Williamson, 1996, pp. 190-192). 
Up to this point we have given an account of the basic TCE argument on the uses of debt 
and equity. We concur with the arguments so far and note again that the empirical literature 
has been largely corroborative. However, if we compare the canonical renditions of TCE 
with the arguments on the uses of debt and equity (particularly Williamson 2008, 2002, 
1996, pp. 171-194) we find that there is basically no discussion on the key issue of bilateral 
dependency. We propose to fill this gap with the theoretical treatment below. 
We start our discussion by observing that, taken as a group, shareholders will always 
depend on the firm (more precisely the party in control of the firm e.g. the entrepreneur or 
the professional management) to take good care of their resources invested therein. 
Although individual shareholders can end their connection with the firm by selling their 
shares, they will usually sell it to other members of the public. The upshot is that, as long as 
the corporation does not buy back its own equity, the investing public taken as a group will 
hold the corporation stocks at all times, will be dependent on the firm, and will not be able 
to terminate the contractual relationship (Williamson, 1985, pp. 304-306).  
7 
 
In contrast, work on the lifecycle of the firm such as that developed by Mueller (2003, 
pp. 80-82) suggests that the firm will not always be financially dependent on the 
shareholders to fund investments in highly specific assets. According to firm lifecycle 
theory, young firms are characterized by rapid growth and by the fact that their positive net 
present value investment opportunities will generally exceed its internal cash flows. For our 
present purpose this means that, since the funding as a rule will not be obtainable from 
internal cash flows, young firms will be dependent on shareholders to finance the specific 
assets necessary for the growth of the firm. Moreover, it is important to note that as young 
firms are usually perceived as being riskier than older well established corporations, lenders 
may be slow to provide the funds and this would tend to increase the company’s 
dependence on shareholders. On the other hand, according to lifecycle theory the 
corporation’s cash flows continually grow over time while its investment opportunities tend 
to decline. Thus, for mature firms, the budget to fund positive net present value investment 
opportunities eventually becomes smaller than internal cash flows. This suggests that 
mature companies will be independent from its shareholders since the funding needed for 
investments in specific assets will be attainable from retained cash flows. Moreover, as 
older well established companies are likely to be perceived by lenders as representing a 
safer bet, the cost of debt for these firms will tend to be lower and this will also tend to 
increase the corporation’s financial independence from shareholders. Thus, from the 
foregoing, we conclude that bilateral dependency will hold for the case of fast growing 
young firms while, in contrast, bilateral dependence will not occur for the case of slow 
growing mature firms. 
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Now, based on the insight that the intensity of bilateral dependency between a firm and 
its shareholders weakens over time, in what follows we develop a theoretical account for 
the equity governance structure which we illustrate with the help of Figure 2. As can be 
seen on the figure, the horizontal axis represents firm age while on the vertical axis we 
portray the cost of managerial discretion. In the graph we represent bilateral dependency 
with the letter b, and as in the previous figure safeguards are denoted with the letter s.  We 
begin our argument by considering the case of a fast growing young firm that is dependent 
on its shareholders for the financing of specific assets needed for growth, which we 
designate “case A” on the left hand side of the figure. As discussed above, the shareholders 
will also be dependent on the firm and thus it is clear that, in this case, bilateral dependency 
will be strong (b >> 0). Thus, case A corresponds to the usual situation described in TCE 
where it is beneficial for both parties to institute strong safeguards, in the form of an 
effective board of directors (s >> 0), “to infuse order … mitigate conflict and realize mutual 
gains” (Williamson 2005). Clearly, in this case the contractual relationship will be 
characterized by low managerial discretion costs and the costs of new equity capital to fund 
investments in specific assets will be relatively low.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
The contractual relationship changes fundamentally as the firm matures and becomes 
financially independent from its shareholders (case B). If the corporation can rely on its 
cash flows to fund those projects which involve specific assets and in addition it must pay 
out part of its earnings as dividends to shareholders then it is likely that insiders in control 
of the firm (professional management being the typical case) will increasingly view 
shareholders as a functionless party that only drains the resources available to the firm. This 
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event would evidently mean the end of the bilateral dependency situation (b = 0). Thus 
taking into account the fundamental TCE behavioral assumption of opportunism it is 
logical to expect that the party in control of the corporation will likely alter the composition 
of the board of directors to the disadvantage of the shareholders. Moreover, with these 
changes it can be expected that managerial discretion costs would increase as shown in 
Figure 2. For instance, the management may start consuming more perquisites (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) or it may decide to reduce the dividend (Jensen, 1986; Mueller, 2003, pp. 
80-82). However, there is good reason to expect that for case B the board of directors 
would still safeguard the investments of equity-holders to a certain extent. In particular, if 
shareholder dissatisfaction with management is too great the stock price may plummet and 
although management may be no longer interested in issuing new equity, the fall in the 
share price may increase the likelihood of a hostile takeover. With the takeover outsiders 
would gain control of the board of directors and may dismiss the management staff. Thus, 
although managerial discretion costs would increase compared to the situation in case A, 
we expect that the threat of hostile takeover would keep them to a moderate level. 
Finally, recent work on corporate governance (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 
2009) suggests that the control of the corporation can effectively insulate themselves from 
the threat of a hostile takeover by having the board of directors set up a wide variety of 
anti-takeover provisions. Now, if such provisions are deployed we reach “case C” in Figure 
2, where managerial discretion costs increase to the point that only the institutional 
constraints (e.g. legal shareholder protection, monitoring by the financial press) would 
protect shareholder assets. Unfortunately for shareholders although these institutional 
constraints may mitigate stealing, they are unlikely to be effective against the reduction of 
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the dividend, or investment in negative net present value “pet projects” that management 
may decide to implement. This is because (in the context of US institutions) the courts are 
unlikely to second guess such business decisions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
The foregoing discussion suggests the following testable propositions: (i) as bilateral 
dependency between the firm and its shareholders weakens the costs of managerial 
discretion will tend to increase; therefore financially dependent firms (case A) should be 
valued more highly by the market than financially independent firms (case B). (ii) As 
financially independent firms deploy anti-takeover provisions the costs of managerial 
discretion would tend to rise even more, hence financially independent firms (case B) 
should be more valuable than similarly independent firms when the latter also have a large 
number of anti-takeover provisions in place (case C). 
 
3. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
In testing the abovementioned propositions empirically, we use Tobin’s q as the 
measure of firm value, which we regress on a measure of bilateral independence, an anti-
takeover provisions index and control variables which are standard in the corporate 
governance and firm value literature (Morck et al., 1988, Bhagat and Black, 2002; Brown 
and Caylor, 2006, Bebchuk et al., 2009). In particular, the following regression equation is 
estimated: 
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Where, Tobin’s q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of a given firm at the 
end of year t divided by the book value of its total assets at the end of year t. Moreover, the 
right hand side of Eq. (1) takes into consideration the corporate governance factors 
discussed in our theoretical section, by including, an index of firm financial independence 
from shareholders the “A-index”3 developed by Saravia (2014) and the index of anti-
takeover provisions “E-index”  (entrenchment index)  proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2009).4  
As explained by Saravia (2014), the A-index is constructed by comparing a firm’s 
annual cash flows with the funds it raises through new equity issuance and retained cash 
flows over the same period (CF  vs. ΔE + CF - Dividends). Following firm lifecycle theory 
(Mueller, 2003, pp. 80-82), the author argues that financially dependent firms will tend to 
be young companies that issue a substantial amount of new equity and pay no dividends so 
that their CF will usually be smaller than their level of investments in specific assets funded 
using new equity and retained cash flows (CF < ΔE + CF - Dividends). In contrast, 
financially autonomous firms will tend to be mature corporations that issue very little new 
equity and pay dividends, so that their CF will be usually greater than their level of 
investments in specific assets funded using new equity and retained cash flows (CF > ΔE + 
CF - Dividends). Furthermore, to mitigate the impact that the business cycle has on the 
firm’s cash flows and investment opportunities, the comparison is performed over a period 
of seven years. In particular, the A-index for a given company in a given year ‘t’ is 
constructed by adding one point for each year in which a company has greater cash flows 
than investments funded with equity plus retained cash flows. Since the comparison is 
performed over the 7 years prior to t, the A-index ranges from 0 to 7. Clearly, firms that are 
                                                          
3
 The “A-index” stands for financial autonomy index. 
4
 See the appendix for details on the calculation and sources of data for all variables in Eq. (1). 
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financially independent from their shareholders obtain a higher score in this index relative 
to those that are financially dependent on their shareholders. 
In addition, we employ Bebchuk et al.´s index of anti-takeover provisions to measure 
managerial entrenchment. We prefer this index to other alternatives since it is constructed 
using a more analytic approach than other indices available in the literature. Rather than 
including every single anti-takeover provision in their index, Bebchuk et al. (2009) base the 
inclusion of each provision on discussions with lawyers, their own personal analysis and 
the examination of provisions that attract opposition from institutional investors. The E-
index comprises six key governance provisions: staggered boards, limits to amend by-laws, 
poison pills, golden parachutes, supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority 
requirements for charter amendments. The index is created for a given firm in a given year 
by assigning a point for each of the six key provisions that the firm has. Thus, the E-index 
ranges from 0 to 6. 
We expect that there will be a negative relationship between Tobin’s q and both firm 
financial independence from shareholders as measured by the A-index and managerial 
entrenchment as measured by Bebchuk et al.’s (2009) index of antitakeover provisions. The 
reason is that, as mature firms become financially independent and antitakeover provisions 
are eventually increased in number, the cost of managerial discretion will tend to increase, 
which in turn will be reflected in a relatively low Tobin’s q.  
Moreover, several additional standard control variables are included in Eq. (1). The 
first of these variables, i.e. CF/totalassets, is the firm cash flow during year t divided by the 
firm total assets at the end of t. It is expected on a priori grounds that this variable will have 
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a positive sign. The key idea behind this variable is that a firm with a large cash flow 
should be more valuable and have a lower risk of default. It may be argued that a large cash 
flow may be negatively related to firm value due to the agency costs of free cash flows 
(Jensen, 1986). However, it is only when the cash flows are larger than the amounts needed 
to fund all positive net present value projects that conflicts of interest manifested in over-
investment can occur, and in Eq. (1) this effect is already captured by the A-index (Saravia, 
2014). Thus, in this paper the positive effect for a firm`s market value of having a large 
cash flow is captured using the CF/totalassets variable in Eq. (1), while the negative effect 
of having “free cash flows” is captured by the A-index.  
Additionally, the control variable salesgrowth is included in Eq. (1). In an influential 
article, La Porta et al. (2002) argue that firms with better investment opportunities should 
have higher Tobin’s qs. To control for investment opportunities these researchers included 
a sales growth variable in their regression equation which was highly significant. Hence, a 
sales growth variable is also included in the firm valuation regression equation above. This 
variable will be measured as the percentage change in the firm’s total sales between the end 
of year t-1 and the end of year t. Based on La Porta et al.’s (2002) arguments it can be 
expected on a priori grounds that there will be a positive relationship between salesgrowth 
and Tobin’s q. 
The next control variable included in Eq.(1), firmsize, is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the book value of total assets at the end of year t. In this paper the rationale 
behind the inclusion of firmsize as a control variable is that traditionally (i.e. before the 
mid-1980s in the U.S.) large firm size used to be considered a sufficient anti-takeover 
defense to allow managements to substantially over-invest without the fear of a hostile 
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takeover (Mueller and Reardon, 1993), and this in turn tended to reduce firm valuations. 
Thus, this variable is expected to have a negative sign. It should be pointed out however 
that, following the hostile takeover wave of the 1980s large firm size may not be an 
effective takeover deterrent anymore, and therefore it is likely that this variable may be 
insignificant for samples taken from more recent periods.  
Next, we include a standard control that the corporate governance literature has used in 
Tobin’s q regressions. Namely leverage, which is measured as the ratio of the book value 
of a firm’s total debt to its total assets. Previous work has reported a negative and highly 
significant relationship between leverage and Tobin’s q (Bebchuk et al., 2009), which is 
also expected in our empirical tests. 
Furthermore, firm age is included as a control variable in Eq. (1). For the reasons given 
in section 2 above, we expect that firmage will have a negative sign. This variable will be 
measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years since the company’s 
incorporation. 
Eq. (1) also includes a set of industry dummy variables. These dummy variables have 
been included in firm valuation regression equations since Morck et al. (1988) to control 
for possible spurious correlation between corporate governance variables and Tobin's q. 
The rationale for the inclusion of the industry dummy variables in Eq. (1) is the following: 
since Tobin’s q is usually computed by dividing market value of the firm by the book value 
of the firm’s total assets, companies in industries with a greater proportion of intangible 
assets will have a higher Tobin’s q when compared to firms in industries with a greater 
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proportion of tangible assets. To control for this difference between industries the inclusion 
of industry dummy variables is required.  
Lastly, Eq. (1) includes time dummy variables to deal with time fixed effects. The 
latter follows recent work by Petersen (2009) on the appropriate econometric methods to 
employ when using panel datasets in corporate finance. In particular, Petersen’s paper 
shows that in order to avoid important pitfalls associated with traditional panel data 
methods, a pooled regression with time dummy variables and standard errors clustered by 
firm can be used. This will be the approach we will follow in the next section. 
 
4. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
4.1. Sample selection 
We started with Bebchuk et al.’s (2009) no dual class stock E-index database which 
contains entrenchment data on U.S. firms for the years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 
2002, 2004 and 2006. Using Datastream, we then searched for firms in Bebchuk et al’s 
database which are not in the banking and financial industries (SICs 6000 to 6999) or in 
certain service industries (above 8100) and that were active between 1990 and 2004. The 
objective behind these criteria was to obtain a sample of firms with a long time series of 
data with which to build the variables in the model and in addition, to exclude companies 
whose capital and investment are fundamentally different to those of most firms in the 
sample. Using these criteria we obtained a list of 475 firms. Following the usual practice in 
corporate governance studies, observations for the years in which governance provisions 
data is not available were filled in by assuming that the provisions remain unchanged until 
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the next year with available data (e.g. Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Bebchuk 
et al., 2013). In this way, we are able to assign values for the 475 firm’s E-indices for a 
period of 19 years, from 1990 to 2008. Market prices and accounting data for the firms in 
the sample were obtained from the Datastream database as described in the Appendix. 
4.2. Sample description 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the empirical variables. As shown, the firms in 
the sample contain substantial variation in their age, valuation, entrenchment index, 
financial independence and other variables of importance for testing our hypotheses.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
It has been pointed out in the literature that samples constructed using as a starting 
point the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) information are likely to contain 
a substantial amount of large companies. This is because firms that are relevant from the 
IRRC perspective are traditionally those in the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 as well as the 
annual lists of large corporations in the publications of Fortune, Forbes, and BusinessWeek 
(Gompers et al., 2003). Since the database in this paper takes as its starting point Bebchuk 
et al.’s  (2009) E-index database which is based on the publications of the IRRC, there is a 
danger that our database contains large firms only. However, inspection of the sample 
reveals that it contains a number of small firms as well.   
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
As shown in Figure 3, although the sample does contain a number of very large firms 
e.g. there are more than 500 firm-year observations in which company total assets are 
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beyond the US$ 25 billion mark, the figure also indicates that the sample contains a number 
of small firms as evidenced by the fact that there are over 1000 firm-year observations in 
the sample where firm total assets are less than US$ 500 million.
5
  Overall, inspection of 
Figure 3 reveals that the sample is not restricted to the very largest firms; instead the figure 
shows that the sample contains a reasonably varied range of company sizes.   
Similarly there is a danger that databases constructed using the information on 
corporate governance provisions published by the IRRC may only contain older companies 
as measured by firm age. This is because older firms are usually also very large. Thus, a 
sample composed of large firms may also contain a substantial number of older firms. 
However, inspection of the sample reveals that it contains a reasonably varied range of 
company ages. As shown in Figure 4, although the database does contain a number of old 
companies, the figure also indicates that the sample contains a number of young firms as 
evidenced by the fact that there are over 1000 firm-year observations in the sample where 
firm age (measured in years since company incorporation) is lower than 30 years. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
Correlations between the empirical variables are presented in Table 2. It is interesting 
to note that the A-index presents a significantly positive correlation with firmage and a 
negative and significant correlation with salesgrowth (our measurement of investment 
opportunities). This suggests that, consistent with firm lifecycle arguments, young 
companies with a low A-index present a higher rate of sales growth, which means that 
young firms have better investment opportunities than mature firms with a high A-index 
and low sales growth. In addition, the table shows that the A-index has positive and 
                                                          
5
 All relevant ítems are deflated using CPI (2000 = 1). 
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significant correlations with firmsize and CF/totalassets. This implies that companies with 
a high A-index are on average relatively larger and have larger cash flows.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Interestingly, while Tobin’s q presents a significantly negative correlation with the A-
index it also displays a very strong and significant positive correlation with CF/totalassets. 
This finding indicates that very large cash flows are not necessarily negative for firm 
valuation; it is the end of the bilateral dependency condition (as measured by the A-index) 
between a firm and its shareholders that increase managerial discretion and not merely the 
size of the cash flows. In other words, it is only when the cash flows are larger than the 
amounts needed to fund all positive net present value projects, and consequently firms are 
financially independent from its shareholders, that conflicts of interest known in the 
corporate governance literature as the “agency costs of free cash flow” occur (Jensen, 
1986).  
On the other hand, Table 2 shows that firmage presents positive and significant 
correlations with both the A-index and the E-index. This implies that as firms mature, and 
on average become more financially independent, a larger number of consequential anti-
takeover provisions are deployed. Moreover, the table indicates that both the A-index and 
the E-index have significantly negative correlations with Tobin’s q.  This finding indicates 
that as firms become more financially autonomous and deploy more antitakeover 
provisions their valuations tend to decline. 
Additionally, Table 2 indicates that both the E-index and firmage have negative and 
significant correlations with salesgrowth. This suggests that it is not in the fast growing 
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young firms that managements deploy the most antitakeover provisions; on the contrary, it 
is in the slow growing mature firms where managements are the most entrenched.  
Lastly, it is worth noting the strong positive correlation between firmage and leverage. 
Since young firms are usually perceived as being riskier than older well established 
corporations, a clear explanation for this correlation is that lenders require a higher risk 
compensation for lending to young firms and consequently young firms tend to rely less on 
debt and instead issue more equity (i.e. young firms tend to depend more on their 
shareholders). On the other hand, lenders will likely require lower risk compensation in 
their loans to mature firms. Accordingly, mature firms can rely more on debt which allows 
these companies to be more independent from their shareholders. 
In conclusion, the sample description above demonstrates that the database contains 
firms with sufficient variation in their age, sizes and other variables for the purposes of 
testing the paper’s hypotheses. Having elucidated this point, the next section employs the 
econometric methods discussed above to perform multivariate tests of the hypotheses. 
4.3. Econometric results 
Table 3 presents the econometric results. Column 1 shows a specification in which 
Tobin`s q is regressed on the A-index, the E-index, as well as the time and industry dummy 
variables. Both the A-index is negative and significant at the 5% level and the E-index is 
negative and significant at the 1% level as predicted. The implication is that Tobin’s q 
declines as both firm financial independence (measured by the A-index) and managerial 
entrenchment (measured by Bebchuk et al.’s (2009) E-index) increase. In other words, 
consistent with our theoretical discussion in section 2, as firms become more financially 
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independent over their lifecycle and the number of consequential antitakeover provisions 
increases, managerial discretion costs escalate. In consequence of the higher managerial 
discretions costs, firm value (measured by Tobin’s q) tends to fall.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Column 2 presents the results of regressing Tobin`s q on the A-index, the E-index, as 
well as most controls in Eq. (1) with the exception of firm age. As shown, the coefficient of 
the A-index becomes more significant and with a higher absolute value than in column 1. In 
particular, note that the coefficient of the A-index is now significant at the 1% level. On the 
other hand, the absolute value of the E-index coefficient becomes noticeably smaller and it 
is now significant at the 5% level. Interestingly, the variable CF/totalassets is positive as 
predicted and is significant at 1% level. This indicates that firms with a larger cash flow are 
more valuable. Taking this result together with that for the A-index above, we conclude that 
with the variable CF/totalassets we are capturing in our regression the positive effect on a 
firm`s market value of having a large cash flow, while the negative effect of having “free 
cash flows” (so often referred to in the corporate governance literature) is captured by the 
A-index. Moreover, salesgrowth is positive and significant at the 1% level. This supports 
the hypothesis that firms with better investment prospects have higher valuations other 
things equal. In contrast, the firmsize variable is insignificant at any conventional level 
which may indicate that large firm size was not an effective takeover deterrent in the U.S. 
stock markets the period in question (1990 to 2008). Importantly, we note that leverage is 
negative as predicted and significant at the 1% level. Considering the correlation between 
leverage and firm age documented in Table 2, our interpretation of this result is not that 
higher leverage causes lower firm valuation. Rather, our conclusion is that, other things 
21 
 
equal, higher leverage is an indicator of firm maturity. The fact that older firms have 
relatively lower costs of debt exacerbates firm financial independence from shareholders 
which results in increased costs managerial discretion. This is what causes the lower 
valuation. Finally, it is interesting to note that the adjusted R
2
 in column 2 is twice as large 
as that in column 1. This suggests that in the context of U.S. stock markets, the income and 
growth prospects of firms, as measured by our control variables, overshadow corporate 
governance variables in explaining firm valuation. 
Next, we remove the A-index and the E-index variables form the regression equation 
and introduce firmage in their place as a measure of the quality corporate governance 
(column 3). If bilateral dependency declines over the lifecycle of the firm and eventually 
antitakeover provisions are put in place by the parties in control of mature firm, as we argue 
in our theoretical section, then there should be a negative correlation between Tobin’s q and 
firmage. As expected, firmage is negative and significant at the 1% level. On the other 
hand, it is noteworthy that all control variables retain their magnitudes and significance 
basically unchanged when compared to the previous regression. 
Finally, column 4 presents a regression of Tobin’s q on the full set of variables in Eq. 
(1). As can be seen, this time although the coefficient of firmage shows the predicted 
negative sign it is insignificant at any conventional level. Comparing the results in columns 
3 and 4, it is clear that the introduction of the A-index and the E-index variables neutralize 
the significance of firmage. Consequently, we conclude that what drives the lower 
valuation of mature firms is the end of the bilateral dependency condition and the 
subsequent managerial entrenchment which occur over time, as measured respectively by 
the A-index and the E-index variables. Overall, we interpret the results in Table 3 as 
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consistent with our theoretical propositions stated in section 2. As bilateral dependency 
between the firm and its shareholders weakens, as measured by an increase in the A-index, 
the costs of managerial discretion escalate. Consequently, financially dependent firms (case 
A) have higher valuations than financially independent firms (case B). Moreover, as 
financially independent firms deploy anti-takeover provisions, as measured by the E-index, 
managerial discretion cost rise further, hence financially independent firms (case B) are 
more valuable than similarly independent firms when their managements are entrenched 
(case C). 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
According to TCE, equity is a governance structure that economizes on transaction 
costs and effectively cements the relationship between the firm and its shareholders when a 
firm finances investments that involve specific assets. This paper examines the theory 
behind this proposition and finds that, for the case of the equity mode of governance, the 
usual TCE logic is not fully worked out. In particular, the paper finds that in previous work 
an analysis of the key issue of bilateral dependency between the firm and its shareholders is 
absent. Taking proper account of the concept of bilateral dependency, the paper concludes 
that contractual hazards are indeed mitigated for the case of fast growing firms whose 
managements are dependent on shareholders to finance future growth. On the other hand, 
for the case of mature firms the paper argues that contractual safeguards such as the board 
of directors are altered to the disadvantage of shareholders, and consequently managerial 
discretion costs increase as the firm becomes financially independent from its shareholders. 
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Consistent with the theoretical section, the empirical section of the paper finds that 
financially dependent firms have higher valuations than financially independent firms. 
Moreover, financially independent firms are more valuable than similarly independent 
firms when their managements are entrenched. 
In considering the public policy implications of this paper it is important to revisit the 
remediableness criterion. This criterion states that “an extant mode of organization for 
which no superior feasible form of organization can be described and implemented with 
expected net gains is presumed to be efficient” (Williamson, 2010, emphasis in the 
original). In this sense, assuming that the objective of a public policy maker is to improve 
corporate governance, then the present work suggests that one effective policy would be to 
outlaw the deployment of anti-takeover provisions. If this policy were implemented, the 
effect would be an increase in the strength of the safeguards of the equity governance 
structure. In consequence managerial discretion in mature firms would be curtailed as the 
attributes of “case C” equity governance structures are transformed into those of “case B” 
structures (Figure 2). On the other hand, the present TCE analysis suggests that public 
policy that aims to curtail managerial discretion further, for instance by requiring a majority 
of independent directors in the board, is unlikely to succeed. Once bilateral dependency no 
longer holds equity capital is no longer needed, and managements are likely to prefer relief 
from the monitoring pressures that come from a strong board of directors. It is not difficult 
to see how managements can achieve this goal, for instance they could appoint sympathetic 
independent directors. Thus, we conclude that although managerial discretion costs are 
higher for “case B” equity governance structures when compared to those of “case A” 
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structures, the former structures should be deemed efficient according to the 
remediableness criterion. 
 
APPENDIX 
This appendix explains how the variables used in the empirical section were put 
together and the data sources used in their construction. Since our main source of market 
and financial data is Datastream, in what follows we present Datastream data-types in 
parenthesis. 
First, we compute Tobin’s q by dividing the market value of a given firm at the end of 
year t the book value of total assets (wc02999).
  
Where, the market value of the firm at the 
end of year t is calculated by adding the market value of common stock (wc05301 x P) plus 
the book value of total debt (wc03255) and preferred stock (wc03451). Note that the value 
common stock is computed by multiplying the end of fiscal year number of shares 
(wc05301) times the end of fiscal year price per share (P).   
Second, the A-index is calculated by adding one point for each year in which a 
company has greater cash flows (wc04201) than investments financed using equity and 
retained cash flows over the previous 7 years (from t-7 to t-1).
6
 To calculate investment 
                                                          
6
 Please note that 201 firm-year observations of the A-index (2.3% of de total) correspond to companies 
floated in the market less than eight years before the first year in our sample (i.e. 1990), so that in these cases 
the 7 years data to compute the index was not available from datastream. Consistent with firm lifecycle 
theory, we assumed that these companies were floated in the stock market precisely because of the need to 
finance specific assets in excess of their cash flows. Hence, we computed the A-index in these 201 cases by 
assigning zero points for each of the years before market listing. We recalculated all the tables in the paper 
with and without these 201 observations. The results were not affected in their sign, magnitude and level of 
statistical significance. Thus, we decided to present the results with the 201 observations included in the 
database. 
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financed with equity and retained cash flows over year t we subtract dividends (wc04551) 
from cash flows (wc04201) and then add net new equity (the change in the number of 
shares wc05301 times average share price P over year t).  
Furthermore, Bebchuk et al.’s (2009) E-index is taken from Bebchuk’s webpage 
(available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data/shtml). On the other hand, 
we calculate CF/totalassets, by dividing the firm cash flow during year t (wc04201) by firm 
total assets at the end of t (wc02999). Next, salesgrowth is computed by calculating the 
annual percentage change in the firm’s total sales (wc01001) between the end of year t-1 
and the end of year t.  
We measure firmsize as the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets 
(wc02999) at the end of year t. Moreover, leverage is measured as the ratio of the book 
value of a firm’s total debt (wc03255) to its total assets (wc02999). On the other hand, to 
compute firmage our main data source was the 2004 Mergent Industrial Manual which lists 
companies’ dates of incorporation. This variable was calculated by subtracting the year in 
which the firm was incorporated from the appropriate year in the panel dataset. Finally, 
note that prior to the calculation of the variables all relevant items were deflated by using 
the CPI (2000 = 1). The CPI data for the U.S. were obtained from the World Bank, World 
Development Indicators, ESDS International, University of Manchester. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics  
This table presents summary statistics for the empirical variables in the paper. A-index is a firm-level 
index of financial independence (autonomy) from shareholders which is calculated by adding one point 
for every year in which a given firm’s cash flows are greater than its investment in specific assets, over 
the previous 7 years. E-index is the managerial entrenchment index constructed by Bebchuk et al. 
(2009). Tobin’s q equals the market value of the firm at the end of year t divided by the book value of 
total assets at the end of year t. CF/totalassets is the ratio of the firm cash flows during year t divided 
by total assets at the end of year t. salesgrowth is computed as the percentage change in the firm’s total 
sales between the end of year t-1 and the end of year t. firmsize is  the natural logarithm of the book 
value of the firm’s total assets measured at the end of year t in USD. leverage is the ratio of the book 
value of a firm’s total debt to its total assets. firmage is the natural logarithm of firm age which is 
measured in years since the company’s incorporation date. 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
A-index 8687 5.0199 6.0000 2.1651 0.0000 7.0000 
E-index 8687 2.6594 3.0000 1.3638 0.0000 6.0000 
Tobin’s q 8646 1.5137 1.1258 1.2258 0.0360 15.8453 
CF/totalassets 8685 0.1116 0.1043 0.0651 -0.3643 0.6186 
salesgrowth 8686 0.0584 0.0365 0.2263 -0.9984 6.8451 
firmsize 8687 21.6734 21.5809 1.4737 17.2768 27.2513 
leverage 8678 0.2562 0.2581 0.1509 0.0000 0.9387 
firmage 8687 4.0373 4.2195 0.6085 0.0000 5.0752 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix 
This table presents the correlation matrix for the empirical variables in the paper. A-index is a firm-level index of 
financial independence (autonomy) from shareholders which is calculated by adding one point for every year in 
which a given firm’s cash flows are greater than its investment in specific assets, over the previous 7 years. E-
index is the managerial entrenchment index constructed by Bebchuk et al. (2009). Tobin’s q equals the market 
value of the firm at the end of year t divided by the book value of total assets at the end of year t. CF/totalassets is 
the ratio of the firm cash flows during year t divided by total assets at the end of year t. salesgrowth is computed as 
the percentage change in the firm’s total sales between the end of year t-1 and the end of year t. firmsize is  the 
natural logarithm of the book value of the firm’s total assets measured at the end of year t in USD. leverage is the 
ratio of the book value of a firm’s total debt to its total assets. firmage is the natural logarithm of firm age which is 
measured in years since the company’s incorporation date. * and ** indicate a statistically significant correlation at 
the 1% and 5% level respectively. 
Variable A-index E-index Tobin’s q CF/total-
assets 
salesgrowth firmsize leverage firmage  
          
A-index 1.0000         
E-index 0.0503* 1.0000        
Tobin’s q -0.1113* -0.1324* 1.0000       
CF/totalassets 0.0219** -0.1005* 0.5803* 1.0000      
salesgrowth -0.1222* -0.0323* 0.1315* 0.1171* 1.0000     
firmsize 0.0855* -0.0830* -0.0076 -0.0353* 0.0435* 1.0000    
leverage 0.1060* 0.1127* -0.3127* -0.3717* -0.0194 0.2533* 1.0000   
firmage 0.4158* 0.1533* -0.1759* -0.1314* -0.0718* 0.2230* 0.2030* 1.0000  
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Table 3. Econometric results 
This table presents the results of regressing Tobin’s q on corporate governance and control variables. Tobin’s q 
equals the market value of the firm at the end of year t divided by the book value of total assets at the end of year t. 
A-index is a firm-level index of financial independence (autonomy) from shareholders which is calculated by 
adding one point for every year in which a given firm’s cash flows are greater than its investment in specific 
assets, over the previous 7 years. E-index is the managerial entrenchment index constructed by Bebchuk et al. 
(2009). CF/totalassets is the ratio of the firm cash flows during year t divided by total assets at the end of year t. 
salesgrowth is computed as the percentage change in the firm’s total sales between the end of year t-1 and the end 
of year t. firmsize is  the natural logarithm of the book value of the firm’s total assets measured at the end of year t 
in USD. leverage is the ratio of the book value of a firm’s total debt to its total assets. firmage is the natural 
logarithm of firm age which is measured in years since the company’s incorporation date. Industry dummy 
variables are constructed based on firms’ two digit SIC industry codes. In addition, year dummy variables are 
included to pick up movements in stock market values that are common to all firms. * and ** indicate a 
statistically significant coefficient at the 1% and 5% level respectively (one tailed t-test). The table reports standard 
errors clustered by firm in parentheses. 
Variable 
Predicted 
sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
        
A-index - -0.0369** -0.0527*  -0.0441*  
   (0.0184) (0.0142)  (0.0150)  
        
E-index - -0.0857* -0.0462**  -0.0424**  
   (0.0290) (0.0208)  (0.0212)  
       
CF/totalassets +  8.9612* 8.7745* 8.9026*  
    (0.6800) (0.6760) (0.6669)  
        
salesgrowth +  0.2788* 0.3098* 0.2714*  
    (0.0774) (0.0830) (0.0753)  
        
firmsize -  0.0134 0.0265 0.0189  
    (0.0212) (0.0223) (0.0216)  
        
leverage -  -0.6934* -0.7283* -0.6786*  
    (0.1761) (0.1805) (0.1737)  
       
firmage -   -0.1625* -0.0938  
    (0.0604) (0.0624)  
 
Industry dummy variables  yes yes yes yes  
        
Time dummy variables?  yes yes yes yes  
       
       
Adjusted R2  0.2238 0.4530 0.4483 0.4544  
Number of observations  8646 8637        8637         8637  
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Figure 1. Efficient alignment hypothesis. 
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Figure 2. Evolution of the equity governance structure (                      𝑘 > 𝑘 ). 
Case B. Weak board but takeover threat safeguards (s > 0) 
Case C. Weak board, takeover threat neutralized, institutions protect investments (s = 0) 
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